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WHAT SCREEN DO YOU HAVE IN
MIND? CONTESTING THE VISUAL
CONTEXT OF LAW AND FILM

STUDIES
Richard K. Sherwin
We are living at a time when writing is rapidly losing its social and ideological hegemony.
As it gradually gives way to such audio-visual media as television and computers, our

preferred styles of communication and legal expression will increasingly come to match the
sensory capacities and prejudices of these new technologies. (Bernard Hibbitts, 1992, p. 887)
Visual experience, like its linguistic equivalent, can only mean something in relation to
pre-existing cultural and social formations ...

'Between retina and world is inserted a

screen of signs, of all the multiple discourses on vision built into the social arena.' (Stuart
Clark, 2007, p. 6)

Law cannot flourish without memory. Legal meanings require a stable
medium in order to persist over time. However, there are occasions in the
history of culture and technology when the media through which law's
meanings are produced and distributed undergo radical transformation.
During such transitional periods changes occur in the way legal meanings are
performed, recorded, and construed. And when the epistemology, interpretive
practices, and everyday craft of law undergo significant change, normative
consequences are sure to follow.
It is a commonplace that we are now living in a period of transition with
regard to society's dominant forms of communication. As Bernard Hibbitts,
among others, presciently observed (Hibbitts, 1992), law has been adapting
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to a culture-wide shift from the hegemony of the written word to the
hegemony of the visual-aural media of television, film and, more recently,
the exploding digital domain of computers, smartphones, and the Internet.
How this profusion of screens large and small is changing the way people
think about and practice law and, more particularly, how particular kinds of
screens bring about particular kinds of changes, have yet to be adequately
thought through by legal scholars.
One general observation, concerning epistemology, may be offered without
cavil. The Cartesian model that played such a large role in shaping and
informing the modernist mindset has lost its privileged status. According to
the Cartesian model of subjective rationality, "the intellect inspects entities
modeled on retinal images ... In Descartes' conception - the one that became
the basis for 'modern' epistemology - it is representations which are in the
'mind'" (Rorty, 1979, p. 45). It is this rationally detached viewpoint that
helped advance objective perspectivalism as the dominant scopic regime of
modernity. The Cartesian gaze "contemplates the visual field from a vantagepoint outside the mobility of duration, in an eternal moment of disclosed
presence" (Norman Bryson, "The Gaze in the Expanded Field," in Foster,
1988, p. 7). Consistent with Descartes' method of systematically shutting
down the senses ("I will now shut my eyes, I shall stop ears, I shall disregard
my senses") (Descartes, 1951 [1641], p. 33), disembodiment was the Cartesian
formula for epistemological certainty. Cut off from the body's susceptibility
to fleeting impulses and endless deceits, the disembodied, rational mind was
able, according to Descartes, to ascertain truth with a heretofore
unprecedented clarity and distinctness. As Martin Jay observes, "The
abstract coldness of the perspectival gaze meant the withdrawal of the

[viewer's] emotional entanglement with the objects depicted in geometricized
space ... The moment of erotic projection in vision - what St. Augustine had
anxiously condemned as 'ocular desire' - was lost as the bodies of the painter
and viewer were forgotten in the name of an allegedly disincarnated, absolute
eye" (Foster, 1988, p. 8).
In more recent times, the Cartesian epistemology has been attacked on
many fronts. Phenomenologists of perception, like Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
were especially critical of the ahistorical, disembodied nature of the Cartesian
subject which seems somehow to exist apart from what Merleau-Ponty
referred to as our embeddedness in the "flesh of the world" (Merleau-Ponty,
1964, p. 271). The advent of film, television, and computer screens in late
modern society adds a potent, albeit quotidian, dimension to this critique,
for if one thing is certain now it is that with the growing hegemony of moving
images on the screen the senses have returned with a vengeance.

-
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This profusion of sensation is no idle matter, particularly when it comes
to law's migration to the screen (Sherwin, 2006a; Sherwin, 2000). Every
commemorative and constitutive performance of law presupposes what
Kenneth Burke has called a "terministic screen" (Burke, 1966, p. 45), which
is to say, a nomenclature, a set of interpretive practices, and an emergent
"tacit knowledge" (Polanyi, 1967) or sense of practical wisdom (manifest in
the intuitions of experts in the craft of making and interpreting a particular
screen's information flow). When we watch the performance of legal
meaning on the screen (in court and out) the terms of power, knowledge,
and discourse shift away from the logocentric conventions of the modernist
tradition. The disincarnated Cartesian gaze now actively competes with
ocular desire in the flesh of the eye. It is also important to note, however,
that the experience of visual meaning is not the same from one screen to
another. Visual images play differently on the silver screen than they do on
the digital screens of computers and handheld devices (such as ipods and
smartphones). The worlds that these images construct, and the way we
inhabit them - who we become and how we relate to others (or fail to)

reflect concomitant differences in visual mediation. Accordingly, it is
incumbent upon legal scholars today to carefully assess the way of life or
customary practices that constitute contemporary visuality. This includes
not only aesthetic (or rhetorical) accommodations of visual meaning to
discrete modes of mediation, but also the way law regulates, by authorizing
or excluding or otherwise adapting, what appears on a given screen.
Challenging the visual context of law and film studies requires a more
critical encounter with the shifting meaning-making practices and norms
consonant with a particular sensorial regime of visuality. In this view, law and
film studies may be resituated within the larger field of visual legal studies.
This broader perspective opens law and film studies to a phenomenology of
legal perception as well as a hermeneutics of visual legal meaning. In what
follows, I will explore the implications of adopting this approach by taking up
some of the commonalities and distinctions that ought to be noted when we
talk about the varieties of legal experience on the screen.
We begin with the obvious, namely: that the disembodied gaze, the
offshoot of an era that privileged the letter of the law, is now in decline. In its
place, we are witnessing a dizzying proliferation of visual images as an
integral part of the practice and culture of law. There are signs that this
postmodern (post-Cartesian) scopic regime may also coincide with the
emergence of a new baroque era (see Jay, 1993; Richard K. Sherwin "AntiOedipus, Lynch: Initiatory Rites and the Ordeal of Justice" in Sarat, 2005).
As in the baroque period of 17th century Europe, visuality is now undergoing
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an extensive process of de-rationalization (see Clark, 2007, pp. 92-111,
266-280). With the unraveling of the Cartesian dream of universal, objectivist
rationality, we are witnessing a renewed modesty in our epistemological
aspirations. Postmodern constructivism, like the 16th and 17th century
humanism that preceded it, obliges us to accept uncertainty, ambiguity, and
pluralism. There is no escaping multiple systems of meaning.2 At the same
time, Cartesian disembodiment is now giving way to the tactile, vivid, and
emotionally intense visual experience of moving images on the screen. We
delight in quick sensation. Yet, we also know that sensation over time grows
stale. The carnate gaze of the viewer becomes increasingly susceptible to a
longing for that which lies beyond desire's vertiginous, disintegrating
insatiability. A suspicion emerges couched in a mood of uneasiness that
implicates an underlying absence. This nostalgia for deeper significance is
a telltale sign of the empty metaphysics of the baroque (see Kracauer, 1995,

p. 129; Benjamin, 1985).
The temptation to fill persistent longing (or at least to distract it) with an
ever-mounting intensity of visual sensation and rapidity of image flow
produces what Martin Jay has aptly called "a fetish of the material surface"
(Foster, 1988, p. 20). This is akin to the infamous phantasmagoria of the
baroque spectacle. Its political and legal implications are no less alarming
than its epistemological ones. As Christine Buci-Glucksmann has noted, there
is a certain "madness of vision" that characterizes the baroque (BuciGlucksmann, 1986), a madness that may be yoked not simply to desire, but

also to the manipulations and deceits of desire in the service of power (see,
e.g., Maravall, 1986). This was the baroque spectacle of Church melded with
State in the Counter-Reformation, a phenomenon not without some
resemblance to late modern (arguably postmodern) authoritarian developments in which the "engineering of consent," the "society of spectacle," and

the political ascendance of manipulative "media events" (constructing
artificial, preferred realities), similarly risks power's characteristic drive
toward totalization. How contemporary legal practices contribute to or
defend against this danger is another aspect of the scholarly mandate to
grapple more attentively with the interpretive and normative properties of law
on the screen.
Hence, we are led to a preliminary query: What kind of knowledge does

law and film studies produce, and what is its knowledge good for?
Cinema is a significant part of popular culture, and the law film constitutes
a significant genre of cinema (Sherwin, 2000). Law on the screen shows the
way people interact with the figures and plots and institutions of law in
addressing social conflict and personal transgression. Film thus serves as a
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powerful tool for teaching localized as well as cross-cultural insights about
law and justice. Law on the screen is popular legal culture in action.
Popular legal culture breeds common sense expectations about how law
operates in real life (Devereaux & Hillman, 1995).3 It feeds the mind with
law stories as well as with storytelling practices and value assumptions that
people carry with them into courtrooms and voting booths. Law on the
screen is a form of law in action.
Law lives in images the way images live on the screen. Connecting law with
film presumes a distinct way of meaning making. As Jennifer Deger puts it,
"These technologies do not simply produce multiple versions of 'reality,' they
constitute the very grounds of what is knowable" (Deger, 2006, p. xxv). In
Annette Hamilton's words, "from the viewpoint of the emergent visual-aural
culture of the twenty-first century, 'what's on' creates the very grounds of
what is known and hence finally for what 'is'" (Hamilton, 2002).

Increasingly, theorists of film are taking note of the "carnate sensuality"
of the film experience. As Sobchack succinctly puts it, "The flesh is intrinsic
to the cinematic apparatus, at once its subject, its substance, and its limit"
(Sobchack, 2004, pp. 56-61). In the experience of film "we are caught up
without a thought (because our thoughts are elsewhere) in the vacillating and
reversible sensual structure that both differentiates and connects the sense of
my literal body to the sense of the figurative bodies and objects I see on the
screen" (p. 77).

In other words, while it is the case that film viewers are in a certain sense
passive, or only partially fulfilled sensually, it is also the case that the viewer's
sensing capacity is enhanced. As Sobchack puts it, at the movies we "feel
ourselves feeling." "I have become not only the toucher but also the
touched" (p. 77). In short, film activates the human mimetic capacity.
Through mimesis we open up to the presence of objects and others before us.
This is a process of identification. We are embodied through the other in a
sympathetic immersion in the other's being. This kind of mimetic knowledge
is non-conceptual and unstable. As Taussig writes, "at any moment mimesis
is likely to wildly spin off into sense-fragments or unstoppable metamorphoric reproduction" (Taussig, 1992, p. 37). Through mimesis we identify

with what we see, and our senses dissolve into the senses of the other. In
other words, it is through the sensorium of the body that the film viewer
experiences what is in play on the screen. It is perhaps here that the senses
become "their own theoreticians" (p. 253). Through mimesis we are led to
appreciate the dynamic, open-ended process of construction through which
we seek meaning. In some cases, this may lead us to experience anew deep
values that invest discrete human relationships with significance in a given

&
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social and cultural context. 4 In other cases, however, we may simply
encounter the embodiment of sensation for its own sake.
Notably, computer-based visual digital culture introduces its own distinct
meaning-making forms and practices and its own set of epistemological
strengths and dangers. These developments include: remediation (Bolter
Grusin, 2000), disintermediation (Brown & Duguid, 2002), hyper-mediation
(Wagner, 2006), and a variety of screen interactive practices (such as burning,
remixing, multiplayer gaming, and wiki co-productions, to name a few). It is
important to understand the constitutive and mimetic power and effects of
these novel forms of digital meaning making. Digital communication
technologies, like Cover's Decalogue (Cover, 1983), have their own worldbuilding (and perhaps world altering) potential (see Benkler, 2006). And it is
important to bear in mind the extent to which the scopic regime of the
computer screen may differ from cinematic experience. For example, in
cinema the image streams forward in time. Whether the editorial expansion
and contraction of experience operates through flashbacks, flash forwards, or
freeze-framing, whether it deploys fast motion or slow motion, film
nevertheless invites us into what may be phenomenologically described as
presencing, a sense of coming into being and signifying that irreversibly
streams forward in time. The film experience thus creates its own "subjective
temporality," what Sobchack describes as "a presence in the present" that
is informed by film's connection to "a collective past and an expansive
future" (Sobchack, 2004, p. 151). This sense of film's temporality is experienced in the cinematic subject as part of the viewer's mimetic sensorium
(Merleau-Ponty's "flesh of the body" through which we experience the "flesh
of the world" and its mimetic representations). In contrast, the electronic
screen of digital computers may present a very different experience of time

and the body.
On the electronic screen we confront a concatenation of discrete images
that self-present like pearls on an endless string, each one an insular, freestanding moment, a monadic "now." 5 Each of these momentary presents
invites the viewer to experience its own instantaneous stimulation, a sensation
without past or future. The algorithmically generated, de-materialized digital
domain takes us into an electronic world that is "spatially decentered, weakly
temporalized and quasi-disembodied (or diffusely disembodied)" (Sobchack,
2004, p. 53). We are thus encouraged to dissolve the body into an inhuman
digitized sensorium, a constellation of simulations (or simulacra) rather than
a copy of an original. In place of the temporal (narratival) flow of cinema
here we find ourselves immersed in and adrift on endless currents of
contiguous data, momentary inputs, and transient sensations. And each
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digital (algorithmically constructed) present may be isolated, copied,
recombined, and replayed at will.
In short, the irreversible narrative temporality of film is alien to the
perfectly fungible, digital scopic regime. In the digital domain of the Internet,
for example, dispersal and diffusion tend to displace temporal continuity. As
a consequence, the experience of a temporally stable mimetic identification,
together with the affective investments that such stability invites and allows,
may be eroded, if not lost altogether. To the extent one is confronted within
the digital domain by the weighty emotional charge of solicitude toward
another's suffering or need, the opportunity and temptation to quickly surf
away - in search of a new image stream, a new game, or a new thread of
conversation - readily arise.6 The digital spectacle is, in this sense,
reminiscent of the self's narcissistic dissolution in the kinetic stimulation of
efflorescent baroque representation with its promise of delight amid endlessly
proliferating decorative form. This baroque efflorescence (or lightness of
being) may occlude the kind of face-to-face encounter upon which ethical
reality depends (see Levinas, 1969). In other words, the hyper-flat screen of
the digital baroque risks foreclosing an experience of transcendent otherness.
In the digital simulacrum there may be no way out of the monadic sensorium
of subjective sensation and self-absorption (see Murakami, 1994). Within the
immanent order of digital baroque ornamentation, we may find no staging
area for transcendent experience or knowledge beyond the sensorial eye. This
discouragement of egological demotion in the service of mimetic identification with the other may carry severe ethical consequences. Is justice possible
absent the mimetic capacity to de-center the self in order to identify
responsively with the plight of others?
As the preceding discussion may suggest, law on the screen gives rise to a
distinct way of doing jurisprudence. In this sense, it is incumbent upon legal
scholars to discern with great care the kind of reality and the way of being
that cinematic and electronic screens invite us to assume. Jurisprudence
theorizes law in accordance with the cultural and cognitive meaning-making
tools at its disposal: story frames, character types, social scenarios, metaphors, as well as cultural and socially embedded or constructed emotional
patterns (cf. Gross, 2006), among other narratival and purely sensational
elements. Law and film studies thus may be viewed as encompassing a larger
concern with mind and culture. It addresses how a specific set of communication tools in a given socio-legal context polices the production, maintenance, and suppression of meaning and discrete meaning-making practices.
This aspect of the field implicates a rich agenda for empirical research. And
by showing how it is done - how the manifold ways of habituated meaning

-
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making produce, preserve, and exclude possible worlds as well as ways of
being (seeing/experiencing) - visual legal studies may also help to clear a path
toward creative reconstruction. In this respect, law on the screen scholarship
invites an emancipatory as well as an empirical practice, a source of
knowledge as well as a call to action against false necessity (see, e.g., Ratna
Kapur, "Postcolonial Erotic Disruptions" in Sherwin, 2006a). By the same
token, in its replay of stock patterns of local knowledge, in its reconfirmation
of the familiar prejudices and easy affective responses and judgments of
ordinary common sense, the offshoots of a market-driven mass culture, law
on the screen may also be a soporific. Uncritically viewed, it is an invitation to
fleeting sensation, emotional regression, collective fantasy, and historical
amnesia. Law on the screen may simply leave everything as it is (see Michael
Robertson, "Seeing Blind Spots" in Freeman, 2005).
In short, if law lives a life of its own the way images live on the screen,
which is pretty much the way we all live now, it seems fitting to ask: of what
screen, or screens, are we speaking? In an era of technological convergence
involving telephonic communication, instant messaging, peer-to-peer image
sharing on the World Wide Web, cinematic and televisual webcasting,
blogging, and instant journalism, as well as the proliferation of lateral social
networking (neither top-down, nor bottom-up), where images and sounds
and words endlessly intermingle and transform, it makes no sense to restrict
our view of law on the screen to movies. Film (and television for that matter)
has now effectively merged with other elements of visual and aural and
textual flow on the digital screen. Everything is available at once, instantly
streamable - or downloadable to digital storage on ever expanding visual
memory systems. In the digital age of technological convergence, law and film
may be usefully regarded as a particular subset of a larger phenomenology of
law on the screen more generally. Law on the screen is also part of an
emerging digital culture which includes participatory, peer-to-peer, community rated, hyper-democratic practices.7 Law on the screen is wiki-law,
decentralized law, mass aggregated law (see Balkin & Noveck, 2006).
Of course, there are other possibilities as well. Digital law is also to an
increasing extent being commodified on the screen. This is not simply a byproduct of its assimilation into mass mediated popular legal culture. It is also
an offshoot of digitization itself (see Radin, "Information Tangibility" in
Granstrand, 2004). As a matter of law, digital signals have been legally
recognized as having tangible effects in the world. They can "trespass" on
chattels (eBay, 2000), they can be stolen like other tangible goods (Seidletz,
1978), and in time they may even be deemed capable of triggering a variety of
virtual criminal offenses (Lastowka & Hunter, 2004/2005). Far from the
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anarchic, early cyber-utopian visions of a law-free zone, where unregulated
freedom would be the norm, what we are now witnessing is a growing mashup between decentralization and hyper-propertization at the local and global
level. On the one hand, extensive private licensing threatens the tragedy of
the anti-commons (Hunter, 2003) while, on the other, expansive copyright
laws threaten to consign the exclusive privilege of culture production to
global mega-corporations that own the culture's stock of popular images
(Disney, Viacom, Sony).
Extrapolating from these developments, law on the screen is at risk of
becoming yet another commodity produced and disseminated in accordance
with the profit maximizing demands of the market place. This is law as
spectacle, a controlled media event, pitched and packaged like a movie or an
advertising campaign. Law spectacles, we have learned, have a way of spilling
over into larger legal domains. Their "echo effects" legislate from the
notorious case; they spawn reform movements, popular referenda, and state
constitutional propositions, generative of and fueled by orchestrated
emotions and emotion-stoked popular sentiments and prejudices (Surette,
1990, p. 177). For example, with increasing frequency public relations firms
manage corporate litigation well before news of the actual law case hits the
screen. Governments are, of course, no less adept in the stagecraft of law's life
on the screen. With equal virtuosity foreign and domestic policies are made
and delivered as screen-based media events.
Consider in this regard Secretary of State Colin Powell's visually assisted
performance at the United Nations, "proving" (with highly deceptive
visuals) Iraq's alleged development of weapons of mass destruction. This is
but one among many applications of this screen-driven craft. Images are
routinely produced and broadly disseminated in support of assertions of
public necessity, emergency, and patriotism. Pictures persuade through fear
and outrage, empathy and identification with the victim (or the aggressor).
For example, when confronted with film footage documenting his atrocities
against Bosnians, Albanians, and Croats, former Yugoslav President
Slobodan Milosovic insisted at his trial for "crimes against humanity and
genocide" at the international tribunal at The Hague that the images were
an "illusion" created by Western journalists. He then showed a German
made-for-television documentary which he claimed depicted civilians killed

either by NATO bombs in Kosovo and Serbia in 1999 (Cherian, 2002), or by
terrorists (BBC, 2002). Closer to home, lawyers defending the Los Angeles
police officers who beat Rodney King claimed legal victory in state criminal
court largely on the basis of their digitized and re-edited version of George
Holliday's amateur videotape of the event. This is law as a deliberately
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choreographed dance of images, a dance, in this instance, designed to
visually evoke causation. When King rose up off the ground, the defense
team argued, the police batons came down. When he lay prone, as ordered,
the batons went back up. In short, by resisting arrest, King "caused" the
police to respond as they did. "Seeing" this causal connection on the screen
inside the courtroom, jurors reached the conclusion that the defense urged
upon them: Rodney King had been "in charge" of the beating all along
(Martin, 2005).
Law's susceptibility to new forms of manipulation on the screen and its
increased commodification within the mass media also coincide with the
expansion of litigation public relations. It is well known that major class
actions against large corporations can have significant impact on public
confidence and share value. It makes sense, therefore, to calm (or perhaps
threaten to unsettle) the firm's market value in the court of public opinion.
This kind of public relations campaign need not stop when a lawsuit is filed.
The management of public perceptions of the case may continue throughout
the trial and extend well beyond in an ongoing attempt to control the
perceived meaning of a verdict or the outcome of ensuing appeals. The court
of public opinion is not bound by the rules of evidence. As the tort reform
movement has vividly demonstrated, public relations campaigns may play
fast and loose with the truth in exploiting popular public prejudices and
expectations (Haltom & McCann, 2004). Under the right circumstances,
political campaigns and policy-driven interest groups are capable of
generating their own mass media juggernaut quality. This was plain from
the way interested parties leapt onto the Polly Klass bandwagon, exploiting
the emotional appeal of unabated parental grief and retributive anger on the
heels of the kidnapping and murder in California of 13-year-old victim,
Polly Klass. The public campaign for legislative reform, and subsequently
for a public proposition that would entrench California's draconian "three
strikes and you're out" sentencing law, was a visual melodrama of searing
intensity and political success for its proponents. It was made for television

(PBS, 1999).9
As Douglas Reed, a political scientist at Georgetown University has
written, this kind of mass media coverage reflects the workings of what he
calls the "juridico-entertainment complex" (Douglas S. Reed, "A New
Constitutional Regime: The Juridico-Entertainment Complex," in Sherwin,
2006a). In 1965, in Estes v. Texas, the Supreme Court presciently discerned
the danger of this successor to what President Eisenhower had earlier
identified as the "military industrial complex" (Estes, 1965). In Estes, the
Court ruled that televising notorious criminal trials was inherently
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prejudicial. The court recognized that mass media, particularly television,
would cover only those cases capable of drawing commercial sponsorship. In
this way, the public face of the law (law, let us say, as constituted by the
Courtroom Television Network ['Court TV']) would be driven by the
marketplace as defined by other artifacts of commercial film and television.
The popular template for sensational mass media programming thus comes
to dictate not only what kind of law the public sees on the screen, but also
what it subsequently internalizes as "legal reality" (Sherwin, 2000). Cases
and campaigns that miss the mark fall into oblivion. Only commodity
products find their way into the collective consciousness. Hence, by tracking
the popular templates of mass culture and mass marketing, the life of the law
imitates art. As Reed puts it, "the commodification process provides the
mechanism that renders an audience into the functional equivalent of an
electorate" (Sherwin, 2006a, p. 259).
In Reed's view, a powerful expression of the juridico-entertainment
complex unfolded on September 22, 1998, when the House of Representatives released the grand jury testimony of President Bill Clinton. He
writes
Here, the legal forms were clearly secondary to the very public campaign that all

participants conducted in order to shape public opinion. These campaigns, cast within a
legal idiom, were unmoored from their institutional contexts and processed through the

media machine in an effort to secure the political advantage. Although the predicament
Clinton found himself in was perhaps unique, it became a dangerous political and
institutional problem for him solely because of the existence of the juridico-entertainment
complex, which stood poised to transform any proceeding examining the sexual habits of
the President into prime-time coverage. Within this setting, Clinton's videotaped
testimony to the grand jury - which was never asked to actually charge anyone with a
crime - represents the nearly perfect 'document' of the juridico-entertainment complex.

(Sherwin, 2006a, 2006b, p. 259)

Perhaps even more ominously, a television drama, staged in part by
political operatives as a supplement to resolving the vote counting dilemma
that engulfed the presidential election of 2000, provided yet another
expression of the juridico-entertainment complex at work - again, with
profound political impact. As I have recounted elsewhere (http://www.nyls.
edu/pages/4106.asp, 2007), Vice President Gore's team was at a distinct
rhetorical disadvantage on television. While Gore's advocates sought to
calmly educate the public about abstract principles like due process and the
right to be heard in court, and pleaded for patience to allow the courts to
work through the ballot counting controversy, Bush's advocates breathlessly
prophesied social chaos and the imminent breakdown of the republic if
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the matter were allowed to be dragged out further in the legal system.
Using Republican staff members and volunteers to stage disruptive public
demonstrations only added to the screen image of mounting disorder
and institutional breakdown (see, e.g., http://consortiumnews.com/2002/
080502a.html). Spectacular images prompting emotional intensity of any
kind are far likelier to gain and hold attention on the screen.
Communication experts understand this dynamic, and they know how to
orchestrate its visual elements in the service of a particular cause or interest.
As Henry Jenkins, director of comparative media studies at the MIT's,
recently noted, "No sooner is a tool put out than it's taken up by citizens
and turned to political use" (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/tecnology/
6407763.stm, 2007). Jenkins had in mind a popular YouTube video about
Internet neutrality (http://www.askaninja.com/ninjaday, 2007). But in
addition to YouTube's treasure trove of amateur videos online, we are also
increasingly seeing on this and other Internet sites the growing influence of
political and legal commentators. This influence, together with that of
bloggers and other Internet participants, will only grow in the years ahead

(see Liptak, 2007; Law Blog Metrics at http://31epiphany.typepad.com/
31_epiphany/2006/08/casesciting_le.html;

Balkanization,

on cases citing legal blogs, see

2007, at http://balkin.blogspot.com/2007/03/judges-lose-

cite-of-law-reviews-gain.html).
So when we say that no sooner is a tool made available than it is taken up
by the public and turned to political and legal along with commercial use, this
is no small thing. If mind and culture emulate the meaning-making patterns
of the dominant forms of communication technology, it behooves us to

understand what those patterns are and how they operate in practice. Today,
our dominant forms of communication are visual and increasingly interactive.
Digital technology plays out on the screen and it invites us to play along. As
with YouTube and online worlds such as There.com and SecondLife.com as
well as massive multiplayer online games, the kinds of mind and culture that
are emerging are driven by speed, multiplicity ("hyper-mediation"), and easy
adaptation to shifting information flows. This rapid and agile responsiveness

increases the range of diverse inputs, but reduces the size of immediately
assimilable content to blog-able morsels. Contemporary gamers are conditioned to respond rapidly to what they see on the screen, and the tools at their
disposal give them the means of doing so. It should not surprise us to see legal
institutions, including courtrooms, adapt to contemporary changes in mind
and culture in order to meet shifting expectations regarding the look of
information and the methods of meaning making on the screen.

&
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The craft and efficacy of persuasion must adapt to the medium of
communication in which it operates. The text-driven mind is not the same as
the image-driven one. In their psychological and persuasive effects, visuals
differ from words in many ways. For example, visual representations tend to
have a greater impact than non-visual expressions of the "same"
information because visual images tend to be more vivid (Bell & Loftus,
1985; Martin & Williams, 1990). Moreover, the greater salience of visual
information makes it likelier that viewers will take in the information,
remember it, and use it in subsequent judgment tasks. Visual communications are also able to convey more information more intuitively than words
alone and thus enable viewers to understand more. (Compare, for instance,
a computer animated reconstruction of an event to an expert witness's
verbal testimony of the same event.) In addition, photorealistic pictures
tend to arouse cognitive and emotional responses similar to those aroused
by the real thing. (For example, an IMAX movie of a roller-coaster ride can
induce vertigo in viewers who would remain unruffled by a verbal
description.)
When it comes to making propositional claims, visual communications
always leave at least some of their meaning implicit. Even the most ostensibly
parsimonious graphics come loaded with tacit as well as explicit information,
as is clear, for instance, from chemists Ronald Hoffman and Pierre Laszlo's
study of chemical diagrams (Hoffman & Laszlo, 1989; Feigenson & Sherwin,
2007) and Laszlo's work on spectrographic analysis graphics (Hoffman
Laszlo, 1989).10 Simply stated, visual images cannot be reduced to explicit
verbal propositions. What we say can never do justice to what we see. Of
course, common sense also confirms the converse. As Susan Sontag has
written, "All photographs wait to be explained or falsified by their captions"

(Sontag, 2004, p. 9).
Law on the screen privileges meaning making through associational logic
which operates, in large part, subconsciously, through its emotional appeal.
A viewer might be aware that an image is strongly linked to a particular
emotional response without knowing or understanding just what the
connection is. In this respect, then, visual images tend to capitalize on the
power of people's intuitive, gestalt emotional responses to shape their
judgments. These effects operate beneath the radar of awareness and are thus
less amenable to critical scrutiny and counterargument. 1
Finally, construing visual meaning from the screen readily lends itself to
what literary theorists call "intertextual" references (Culler, 2002, pp. 100-118).
By referring to other works, other genres, even other media, screen images
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cue the audience's cultural knowledge and allow them to draw on that
implicit knowledge in responding to what they see (Feigenson & Sherwin,
2007). Of course, words can do this, too; but pictures can do it more
effectively because they do it unconsciously, in a way that embeds the
borrowed cultural value invisibly in the visual representation of the picture's
ostensible subject matter.
If more people in society assimilate filmic or other screen-based stereotypes
and commonplaces (both in terms of visual stylistics and substantive content)
than exclusively literary ones, it makes sense to study how this affects the
way law is understood (by the public at large), how visual advocacy is
practiced (inside the courtroom as well as in the court of public opinion), and
with what cultural and cognitive effects. Power requires efficacy at the local
level. That is why advertisers, politicians, and legal advocates (law reformers
as well as trial attorneys and their agents) have grown adept at televising
their messages and even filming them. For its part, the Internet is only just
beginning to become a significant part of the scene of law's interpenetration
with popular culture.
The proliferation of visually sophisticated smartphones and other
handheld devices, closed-circuit security surveillance, and car-mounted
police cameras guarantee an increased role for moving images in the news
media (online, on cable, and on networks) as well as at trial. As long distance
on screen court appearances (including arraignments and witness testimony)
increase, these visual materials are also bound to find their way into
attorney-produced multimedia montages - in opening and closing statements
as well as during the trial - in an effort to advance a particular party's theory
of the case (http://www.nyls.edu/pages/4142.asp, 2007). The proliferation of

electronic filing procedures makes these kinds of visuals easy to submit on
appeal as a supplement to written briefs. Such visuals may be incorporated
anywhere in the text. Witness depositions, the scene of an accident, a day in
the life of the victim, the conditions of life in prison, the efficacy of an
execution, multimedia montage in opening and closing statements, these and
many other visual aids are becoming part and parcel of the trial process. By
logical extension, the pitting of one legal visual against another is
increasingly likely - whether in the form of independently produced visuals
by each contending party, or based on one party's "remix" of an opposing
party's work. Given the strong technological push toward interactivity with
what appears on the screen, one may also ask, how far off is the day when
jurors' expectations to directly interact with trial visuals during deliberations
will be fulfilled? (http://www.nyls.edu/pages/3967.asp, 2007). And, of course,
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in time whatever appears on the screen at trial is likely to make its way to
other courts on appeal.
We began by asking why law and film? The response I am offering here
suggests that one part of the answer is because we are used to getting a broad
range of information and storytelling from the screen. But, of course, this
realization immediately takes us from the film screen to all screens on which
visual communication plays out. It also takes us from the one-way reception
of traditional film viewing to the interactive norms of multiplayer gaming
and other forms of life online, not to mention shifting practices as a result of

our daily (indeed, our minute by minute) interactions with media-convergent
smartphones and other handheld devices. This technological participatory
imperative includes the capacity to access and remix visual and aural content
in order to communicate whatever it is that we have in mind to share with
others.
In short, the question I think we should be asking as law scholars in the
digital age is how current changes in mind and culture are likely to play out
in legal culture generally? Rather than restrict ourselves to law and film, we
need to be thinking about what it means to experience and produce meaning
on different sorts of screens. In the age of digital convergence, we cannot
relegate the experience of movie watching exclusively to public theaters. On
this view, we would do well to consider the way plotting, character typing,
image framing, and emotional cuing, among other features of visual
storytelling, carry over from the movie screen to the computer screen, and
from the cinema to the courtroom (or the converse route). Simply stated, law
on the screen is now a matter of digital culture writ large (and small). What
gets shown on computer screens and how we respond are crucial issues for
lawyers, judges, law teachers, and legal practitioners (Sherwin, 2006b). Nor is
this simply a matter of cultivating new communication skills, a new
rhetorical toolkit for the digital age, though this is surely no small
professional adaptation in itself. We also need to revise the methods and
topics of legal theory. For example, we need to think through the
implications of elevating the role and cognitive stature of emotion in the
decision-making process. Emotion is the fuel visual images run on. This
tends to supersede traditional ideas about linear logic. Visual communication, with its emotional implicatures, works implicitly and by association, not
deductively or inductively in accordance with explicit logical rules. The
enthymeme has succeeded the syllogism, and the former's repressed premise
is more likely than not to be implicitly cued on the basis of an affective
association triggered by a visual image (Feigenson & Sherwin, 2007). The
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template that legal scholars have in mind when they think about deliberation
may need to be altered. If the culture is training people to think visually,
emotionally, and responsively it will not do to produce lawyers ill-equipped
to adapt legal knowledge and problem-solving methodologies to communication practices that reflect changing cultural and cognitive expectations.
Adapting to interactive "play" may turn out to be more significant than
simply marketing new game consuls. Beyond the imperatives of marketing lie
the imperatives of the lawyer's craft itself.
And then comes the really hard part. After traditional lawyering skill sets
have been re-evaluated, after lawyers begin to understand a little better what
to put on the screen and how to cross-examine it (what kind of visual story
should they tell how, when, and with what emotional impact?), after
lawyers, judges, and legal scholars become more adept at attuning their
objections to specific kinds of visual and emotional prejudice that might be
operating - perhaps implicitly or unconsciously - in the minds of the screen
viewer, after we all have begun adapting pragmatically to the new visual
demands being placed upon the craft of law, there comes a more abstract
challenge. What is now happening to law itself? What is law on the screen?
Is it moving further not simply into a process of commodification, as part of
the juridico-entertainment or digital-interactive process, but also into a
baroque, hyper-flat, recursive network of simulacra, of contiguous,
disembodied intensities? I have referred elsewhere to this phenomenon as
the jurisprudence of appearances (Sherwin, 2000) and, more speculatively,
as a move toward the neo-baroque - law as dream, collective fantasy,
mass spectacle (Richard K. Sherwin "Anti-Oedipus, Lynch: Initiatory
Rites and the Ordeal of Justice" in Sarat, 2005; Debord, 1994; Baudrillard,
2000). Viewed from a different, perhaps more affirmative perspective,
this is also law as transformative, polymorphous, and affirmatively
re-imaginable.
The image, as a Byzantine iconoclast once said, is like "the flesh of the
eye" (Liz James, "Seeing is believing but words tell no lies: captions versus
images in the Libri Carolini and Byzantine Iconoclasm," in McClanan
Johnson, 2006, p. 97). Of central concern here is the guiding insight that
visual images operate in the realm of the body. The knowledge they produce
is sensate knowledge (Marks, 1999, p. 190).12 Its temporality is immediate.
Its field of action is the domain of the immanent.
This is food for thought. Conventional jurisprudes to a significant extent
still dine on a traditional liberal diet of text-based, disembodied (abstract/
conceptual) transcendentals in their discourse on constitutional principles,
due process, and international human rights (see, e.g., Gearty, 2004, p. 19).
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Transcendentals serve an important vertical "trumping" function when
applied to case and policy and constitutional analysis. But the playing field
of law on the electronic screen is flat. Its content has been leveled: one thing

counts as much as another in its discrete moment of transient, on-screen
presence. This is monadic jurisprudence, in the style of Leibniz, and
Deleuze - that great theoretician of the cinema (Deleuze, 1986) and the
baroque fold (Deleuze, 1992). Is a jurisprudence of the electronic screen

desirous (or even capable) of meta-level normative analysis? What does
(can) it know, or care to know, about abstract, vertical transcendentals?
Does anything trump a digital image in principle? How do legal concepts
engage cinematic or digitally simulated knowledge? In this regard, we might
well be witnessing a growing tension among multiple, incommensurable
(and in some, but not all respects, incompatible) epistemological regimes.

Could it be that this is part of what is occurring in the debate that now
swirls around the nation's, or for that matter the world's common wealth:
To what extent does digital information constitute a public culture, a shared
"commons" online, or a private market, the expansively licensed, copyrighted, or otherwise propertized electronic mall cum auction house that
many know as cyberspace? One contender is rooted in the traditional, and

increasingly challenged, classical liberal mindset that centers on disembodied transcendentals, autonomous agents, and private markets. The other is
a newly emerging digital regime built upon a super-flat, infinitely networked,
intensely relational, screen-based flow of immanent flickering images and
multifaceted, collectively distributed, instantly refashionable, hyper-sensate
("protean" [Lifton, 1999]) selves.

A law field constituted by rules and principles operates by way of abstract
transcendentals, a commonplace of the written text. A law field on the
electronic screen constituted by immanent digitized networks operates as a
flattened series of discrete and fleeting insights and impressions, relational
possibilities, and affective intensities, a commonplace of the electronic
gaze.' 3
How then are we to understand law's mimetic performance of meaning on
the screen? What kind of life does it have on what kind of screen? What kind
of knowledge does it produce? The digital image on the electronic screen is a
simulacrum without an original in the human world - though it also holds
out a (perhaps) "post-human" way of being in the world (see Hayles, 1999).
The cinematic image, by contrast, is a likeness to an original as well as a way
of being. By conveying appearances within an irreversible temporal flow it
reveals a gap between actuality (being as it is) and phantasm (being as
it appears to be). Likeness also makes being's withholding of actuality,
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its absence, appear. This conjures a cinematic unconscious. Put differently,
the cinematic image performs desire, and like desire, it carries an absence
within it (Zornberg, 1995). Mimetically dissolved in the image of the other,
we experience insatiable longing. In this respect, we exist as enhanced desire.
This phenomenon helps us to account for the erotic binding force of the
cinematic image. It touches the skin of the eye, and we are gripped,
possessed, seduced. We are also mimetically engaged, actively set in relation
to another. By staging phenomena at one remove from lived experience
cinematic images are at once a dream and a dream of a dream. We glimpse
creative possibilities, out of the corner of our eye (as it were) - ways of
being among and connecting to others and ways of knowing that the screen
stages by means of our active mimetic engagement (see Deger, 2006;
Sherwin, "Law's Enchantment: The Cinematic Jurisprudence of Krzystztof
Kieslowski," in Freeman, 2005). But, like the dreamer who dreams of
dreaming, we break off at that point when the screen's absence, its

withholding of being, appears.
On electronic screens, law, too, may appear and disappear like other
digital intensities that come and go without past or future, each image a
disembodied, monadic present that momentarily flickers and passes away.
Law on the digital screen is thus renewed with every appearance. It changes

as we do. Its rule is instantaneous, and disembodied, without principle or
concept to contain it. Law on the digital screen may be an emanation of
endlessly morphing desire. But does it share with cinema the capacity to
invoke an invisible immanent presence that hovers somewhere beyond the
screen's surface?' 4 Does the digital simulacrum allow for a metaphysics of
transcendent justice: a momentary flash in a revelatory field of mimetic
consciousness which the image on the screen may trigger? In the visual digital
domain do we remain open to what Benjamin once described as the
revolutionary now, that "image which flashes up at an instant," and that
"blasts a specific era out of the homogenous course of history - blasting
specific life out of the era or a specific work out of the lifework" (Benjamin,
1969, pp. 255-263)? In the presence of such an event ("in the moment
when the ethical interrupts or disturbs the ontological" (Schroeder, 1996,
pp. 131-132), the viewer is radically decentered, the ego is demoted before
the transcendent, that "profane illumination" to which Benjamin alludes in
his early work (Benjamin, 1999, p. 217, referring as well to the "intoxicating
component [that] lives in every revolutionary act" [p. 215]). The tear in the
surface of reality, which Elaine Scarry (1999) associates with the "ethical
alchemy" of beauty and justice (Scarry, 1999), takes us beyond ourselves.
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This ek-stasis or radical de-centering of the self is perhaps but another way of
describing the most critical aspect of the human mimetic impulse. Standing
before the transcendent (other/object), we experience an ontological excess
that falls under the rubric of the aesthetic sublime. When that excess swerves
into the gravitational field of the other, the aesthetic sublime attains the
quality of the ethical. In this sense, the ethical transcendent emerges out of
the mimetic capacity to identify with and act in response to the needs and
longing of the other. This is where the aesthetic and the ethical sublime
converge.
Thus are we led to certain emancipatory aspirations (or elegiacal fears)
associated with the screen's potential for (or obstacle to) the revelatory,
ethical enactment of law's polymorphous way of being and knowing
(cf. Goodrich, 1996). The screen may offer a mimetic field for creative
re-production in the gap between being and appearances (see Deger, 2006,
pp. 89-91 [referring to "effective mimesis"]). Of course, there are also risks.
One danger is the inclination to forget history as well as the optical
unconscious (the absence that haunts the image) (see Peter Goodrich, "The
Iconography of Nothing," in Douzinas & Nead, 1999). When the latter
occurs, the gap between being's transcendental field and appearances closes;
being collapses into discrete emanations of desire. Images of law are then at
risk of being totalized, like fetishized commodities or cult personalities.' 5
Beauty, the seductive force of the aesthetic, colludes in this danger by lulling
us into forgetting all but the present moment. In so doing it eases the pain of
infinite longing. But beauty is not justice. The totalized image seduces
the eye and invites us to become one with its monadic presence. This unity
pre-empts the otherness upon which ethical responsiveness depends.' 6 Its
ecstatic certainty masks ethical reality by replacing the infinite burden of
responsibility (for others) with the placatory (ultimately deceitful) comfort
of a totality that demands no more than surrender. In short, beauty tempts
us to forget the perpetual absence of infinite desire. It performs being
poetically (cf. Heidegger, 1976), onanistically (as solipsistic jouissance). In
the end, however, choice, the quintessential act of human judgment in our
face-to-face encounter with others, remains. That is the ethical performance
par excellence that is left to us - when the electronic screen goes dark (if we
let it).
Self-reflective judgment impels us to ask, who has the image on the screen
helped us to become, in relation to what and to whom? What has it allowed
us to know? Ethical judgment impels us to act in response to another, the
one whose face we behold face-to-face. Cultivating self-reflective and ethical
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judgment provides us with a means to authenticate (or cast aide) the image
we see on the screen.
Unlike the pretensions of a totalizing aesthetic, the ethical offers no
certainty, no guarantees. The ethical may be animated and nourished
by the aesthetic, or it may be subordinated to appearances in emulation of a
hyper-aestheticized digital simulacrum. Which path we take depends on

whether, and how, we awaken to the mimetic imperatives of human
judgment. Law on the screen may either reflexively emerge from, or simply

belie, the contested nature of cultural production. Under current conditions
of digital proliferation, the endless folds of law on the screen risk generating
a baroque spectacle (Richard K. Sherwin "Anti-Oedipus, Lynch: Initiatory
Rites and the Ordeal of Justice," in Sarat, 2005, p. 143, citing Wofflin ["the

baroque seeks to stimulate the imagination through infinite figurations, and
the suggestiveness of the indefinite"]). And as those who live under baroque
(or neo-baroque) conditions ultimately realize, there is no guarantee of
awakening (Sherwin, 2005; Sherwin, 2007). Law in the age of spectacle in the
service of totalized power warns of such a fate (Debord, 1994; Auerbach,

1997; cf. Marinetti in Apollonio, 2001; Buci-Glucksmann, 1994). That is
why we must continue to struggle to contest the visual context of law on the
screen.

These ruminations may seem to take us far from what typically
characterizes reflections on law and film. But I think it is only a matter of
time before law and film studies is surpassed by the study of law on the screen
more generally, as I have attempted to describe it in these pages. To be sure,
we will continue to grapple with what is being said about law and lawyers
and legal institutions generally in film (and on television, and blogs, and
multiplayer games, and Internet websites of all sorts). We will continue to

learn about popular and mass culture and by extension about law and the
professional identity of lawyers as it is seen when viewed through the lens of
popular law stories. And we will continue to internalize these lessons and
turn them into pragmatic insights of craftsmanship as we learn more about
how best to optimize the lawyer's cinematic and digital toolkit of visual
rhetoric. Legal scholars will continue to learn more about the various ways in
which power is distributed in society, particularly as we reflect on the
technological means of cultural production and the methods of its
distribution. Who owns culture and who gets to use it, how, and for what
purpose? This question may prove to be the most pressing one of our time

regarding the present health and future fate of a democratic way of life in
the digital age. Various responses are now being played out in the way
the agencies of law tolerate or repress new forms of digital production and

What Screen Do You Have in Mind?

23

peer-to-peer sharing of the fruits of individual and collective labor and
creativity. How culture visualizes the conflict between the commonwealth of
culture and the private domain of marketable goods and services will no
doubt also play a part in the conflict's ultimate resolution.
In this respect, it is fair to say that the technological is unavoidably
political. Those who create the code, as Larry Lessig has said (Lessig, 1999),
help to establish a way of life (a nomos) within the architecture that
particular code constructs and sustains. Code not only fashions knowledge, it
also helps to determine who will receive it, and how they will interact with it.
In short, it sets up a form of life. And, to paraphrase Kenneth Burke, every
coded form of life represses other possible ways of knowing and being among
others in community (Burke, 1966, p. 449 {"A way of seeing is also a way of
not seeing"}). The same may be said for any dominant communication
technology - whether it is film, massive-multiplayer-online-gaming, or some
other on-screen or perhaps eventually direct, brain stimulating (fully
dynamic, real life simulating) medium. In sum, whether the commemorative
medium of law is written language, or the scopic regime of cinema, television,
or the digital simulacrum, its ethical quality ultimately depends upon our

understanding of and response to the mimetic and repressive tendencies that
particular medium encourages in its framing of our encounter with others.
To the extent that the Foucauldian triad - power/knowledge/discourse
(Foucault, 1972) - continues to hold, one may suggest the following friendly
amendment. Let us substitute the term "medium" for "discourse" so that we
may be explicit about the constitutive domain within which, as well as the
tools with which, meanings in that field are being made, construed, repressed,
or altered. This holds for the life that law lives, and the way of being and
knowing that it allows, in its appearances on the various screens we
encounter in everyday life. The ontology as well as the epistemology and
phenomenology of law on the screen constitute not only a new set of visual
legal practices, but also a new visual jurisprudence. This takes us beyond law
and film tout court to the richly differentiated nature of law on the screen in
general.

CONCLUSION
Law on the screen goes beyond film. It takes us to the domains of mind and
culture, power and politics, technology and rhetoric, and the changing
contours and norms of professional practice, craft, and pedagogy. Law on
the screen is a multidisciplinary affair. It embraces empirical/descriptive,
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political/normative, and jurisprudential/theoretical dimensions of scholarship. By codifying what we know and how we know it, culture and
technology mimic the regulatory force of law. But just as law is shaped and
informed by technology and culture so, too, are technology and culture
shaped and informed in turn by law's power to regulate. Code is a two-way
street. Who gets to design the code, how, and with what effect? That is the
political question par excellence of our day.
As in the early days of the law and literature movement, law and film
scholars today struggle with their identity. Is theirs a normative endeavor or a
strictly descriptive one? Over the years, law and literature scholars refined
their agenda to include both. Indeed, it is unlikely the movement would have
prospered as an academic field without its critical, normative dimension:
attending to the disempowered other. The notion of so-called "minority
literatures" speaking truth to power has given the law and literature
movement a stature and sense of purpose that literary description alone
would never have allowed (West, 1984; Goodrich 1996; White, 1990). It also
has helped to open up alternative ways of making sense of self and others in
society. Uncovering and constructing alternative stories reveal the contingency of extant power relations and the means by which narratives reify,
but might also reconstruct identity and shared community values. A similar
development may be discerned in law and film studies and the larger field to
which it belongs, namely: visual legal studies.

The current contest over disintermediation versus re-intermediation,
between commons and market, and between culture and commodification,
is a contest over the production and distribution of knowledge and power in
society. In the current digital age we see this battle being fought among
competing scopic regimes, each of which preserves and construes law's
meanings in its own way, on its own screen, with a mixed set of normative
consequences. For good or for ill, in our time and for the foreseeable future
law's fate will in large part be defined and enacted on the screen. As this
drama unfolds, it is no small matter which screen we have in mind and how
we understand and respond to its particular demands, possibilities, and
dangers.

NOTES
1. See, for example, D. N. Rodowick (2001, p. xi) (noting that "every epoch is
defined by its own practices of knowledge and strategies of power, which are
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composed from regimes of visibility and procedures of expression."); see generally
Manovich (2001) (on how new forms of visual mediation shape and inform the way
we represent and discern reality). On the various ways in which law regulates visual

aesthetics, see Young (2005) and Douzinas and Nead (1999). Finally, on how digital
code in particular regulates what we see on the screen, see Lessig (1999) and Benkler
(2006).
2. Given the constructivist temper of contemporary European and Anglo-American
culture, it is not surprising to encounter a renewed interest in the Pyrrhonic skepticism
of early modern figures such as Montaigne and Leibniz (See, e.g., Clark, 2007;
Toulmin, 1992).
3. As Devereaux and Hillman state: "The filmic forms of knowledge produced in
even so arcane and scientifically oriented a discipline as ethnographic film are
necessarily entwined with the fictional cinematic forms of Hollywood and television,
because the narrative and compositional expectations that even university students
bring to their viewing have been schooled by the movies by TV, and by home videos"
(Devereaux & Hillman, 1995, p. 4).
4. This is the shared epiphany that ethnographer Jennifer Deger brilliantly
documents in her recent book Shimmering Screens: Making media in an Aboriginal

community (2006, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press). Guided by an
aboriginal mentor and filmmaker, Deger helped to produce a well-received
documentary,

Gularri: That Brings Unity. The film incorporated inherited clan

wisdom and ritual in a visual commemoration that, in aboriginal eyes at least, reactivated, as if for the first time, the visible and invisible sources of knowledge
and values that have held together aboriginal clan groups over many generations.

For an example of similar cultural evocations, see Krzysztof Kieslowski's The
Decalogue (Image Entertainment, Poland: 1988-1989), discussed in Richard K.
Sherwin, "Law's Enchantment: The Cinematic Jurisprudence of Kieslowski," in
Michael Freeman, Law and PopularCulture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005,
pp. 87-108).
5. As Kracauer has written, "the ornament is an end in itself" (Kracauer, 1995,
p. 76).
6. To be sure, the psychological and ethnographic research on self and
community in virtual worlds has barely begun. Some preliminary studies, however,
suggest that exiting massive multiplayer games online or communities within
persistent virtual worlds may not be so easy. Significant emotional investment in a
virtual identity (or "avatar") and in online social communities may serve as a
counterpoint to the instability and transience of virtual identities and
social connections online. See Dibbell (1998); Balkin and Noveck (2006); and
Shirky (1996-2004).
7. For a sample of a broad range of ongoing projects exploring the digitally
networked nature of e-democracy, visit New York Law School's Institute for

Information Law & Policy at http://www.nyls.edu/pages/3856.asp
8. According to Brian Martin, "Koon claimed that '[he] had been in charge of
the officers, but Rodney King had been in charge of the situation"' (Martin, 2005,
pp. 307-326). This theme of King being "in charge" was used by the defense throughout the trials and nicely captures the reinterpretation involved. Normally, "in charge"
implies having power or authority, which the police certainly had during the arrest.
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By portraying King as being "in charge" - validly so, from the perspective of police
use-of-force options - the responsibility for the beating was attributed to King. See

generally, Sherwin, 1994a, 1994b.
9. For its part, the Internet is also now intensifying the drive toward the broad

dissemination of commodified legal content. To an increasing extent, legal materials
are making their way onto the World Wide Web. This is the combined work of
individuals and institutions intent on advocating a particular point of view, and of
private companies and public relations agents who exploit the Web's capacity to
reach a global audience with minimal expense and maximum exposure. These
features of the Internet make it an inviting means for distributing legal materials
from real cases. Once this occurs, the same dynamic that Reed associated with the
juridico-entertainment complex comes into play. The more lawyers and judges realize

the risks and opportunities presented by wide scale distribution online, the greater
the temptation to design those materials with that distribution in mind. Again, at
work here is the two-way street effect of law and popular culture. As Daniel Filler
notes, during the Microsoft antitrust litigation both sides posted routine copies of
court filings on their respective websites (Sherwin, 2006a, p. 347). Fuller observes
that "providing actual copies of briefs apparently became a method of spin control."
Notably, these adaptations to the demands of mass cultural marketing need not be

conscious. As Pierre Bourdieu noted in his work on television, media participants are
influenced by "invisible structures" constituted by "a world ruled by the fear of being
boring and anxiety about being amusing at all costs" (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 7). In such a
world, journalists may point to the public's expectations. But as Bourdieu observes,
"in fact they are projecting onto the public their own inclinations and their own

views. Because they're so afraid of being boring, they opt for confrontations over
debates, prefer polemics over rigorous argument, and in general do whatever they
can to promote conflict." What this means in practice is that journalists "can show
the world only as a series of unrelated flash photos." id.
10. Pierre Laszlo, workshop presented at International Conference on Visual
Literacy, Cork, Ireland (April 13, 2005).
11. At the same time, it may also be the case that a sudden insight, or gestalt, might
also occur as an act of recognition of that which is already known on a profound level
by the viewer. As Jennifer Deger observes: "The power of recognition - the moment

of insight when one sees beyond what is already known - arises from the way it allows
us to glimpse something more, something new, yet nonetheless somehow known or true.

As a technology of showing, the camera thus brings an ontological charge of truth far
exceeding the verisimilitude of the 'realistic' likeness . . " (Deger, 2006, p. 199).
Notably, the filmic function of "presencing" might operate on a representational or a
symbolic level. For an example of the latter, consider Renaissance symbolic painting,
such as Botticelli's Primavera. As Charles Dempsey observes regarding the Greek
rhetorical term Ekphrasis:"It is a rhetorical means of persuasion, and indeed a means
of setting before the eyes and making present the reality that lies behind the actual
experience of the thing described" (Dempsey, 1992).
12. As Laura Marks states: "Haptic cinema does not invite identification with a
figure - a sensory-motor reaction - so much as it encourages a bodily relationship
between the viewer and the image" (Marks, 1999, p. 164). She adds: "Tactile
epistemology involves thinking with your skin ... Haptic cinema, by appearing to us
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as an object with which we can interact rather than an illusion into which we enter,
calls upon this sort of embodied and mimetic intelligence" (p. 190).
13. As Douzinas and Nead write in Law and the Image (1999, p. 7): "Images are
sensual and fleshy; they address the labile elements of the self, they speak to the
emotions, and they organize the unconscious. They have the power to short-circuit
reason and enter the soul without the interpolation or intervention of language or
interpretation." Note that the so-called "posthuman" turn in cybernetics posits a
virtual, algorithmic reformulation of what we regard as embodied existence in real
life. As N. Katherine Hayles (1999, pp. 2-3) puts it: "The posthuman view privileges
informational pattern over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological

substrate is seen as an accident of history rather than an inevitability of life ... The
posthuman subject is an amalgam, a collection of heterogeneous components, a
material-informational entity whose boundaries undergo continuous construction
and reconstruction."
14. In his final work, Deleuze describes a transcendental field as "a pure stream of
a-subjective consciousness, a pre-reflexive impersonal consciousness, a qualitative
duration of consciousness without a self ... Were it not for consciousness, the
transcendental field would be defined as a pure plane of immanence, because it eludes

all transcendence of the subject and of the object. Absolute immanence is in itself: it
is not in something, to something ... " (Deleuze, 2001, pp. 225-226).
15. Andy Warhol's silk screens may best be understood from this perspective
(Sherwin, 2000, p. 28). As Johannes Birringer writes: "Warhol's fascination to the
totalizing commodity system was so complete that it exemplified the disappearance
of art's separate status and of all traditional aesthetic values of distinction.

In its convergence with fashion, advertising, and the production of commercial
culture as such, Pop Art's method of reproducing mass-reproduced reality - in the
surfaces of soup cans or the faces of stars - made it an art of disappearance that
paradoxically both exposed the commodity character of all contemporary art

production and exaggerated its visual synthesizing of all mass-cultural forms"
(Birringer, 1991, p. 117).
16. See Brian Schroeder, Altared Ground, 1996, p. 40 ("A relation with a being or
mode of being [for example, with the beautiful] would be a solitary, impersonal
relation characterized as reason."). See also id. at 39 ("Unlike the form of justice, the
beautiful is essentially a-moral and, secondarily, a-social. And unlike the ethical
metaphysics proposed by Levinas, that of the beautiful does not allow for the
complete transcendence of the Infinite, of difference itself, of the absolutely other.

Such a metaphysic, which tries to establish or ground a non-hierarchical dialectic
between unity and multiplicity, inevitably slides back into a philosophy of totality or
identity.").
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